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The paper examines factors contributing to development and revealing of conflict, provoking people to 
aggravation of contradictions, resulting in corrupt behavior in the private sector. The main conflict-
generating factor, according to the author, is presence of contradictions in the person, who has been 
delegated with power, between his personal interests and interests of the organization. In most cases, 
the person focuses on the immediate areas, both territorial and temporal (the sphere of immediate 
interest), this leads to the fact that what falls within this sphere has more value than what lies beyond. 
This circumstance also reinforces the priority of group and individual interests, which are usually 
located in the sphere of a person’s immediate interest, above all others, including the persons who 
direct the work of the organizations in the private sector or work in any capacity in such organizations. 
Thus, the propensity for corruption is not an exception, but rather is part of human nature. But with 
management mechanism becoming more complicated, certain powers being delegated to a certain 
person who directs the work of an organization in the private sector or work in such an organization, 
the circle of common interests becomes much broader than those that fall within the immediate interests 
of this person. Group and individual interests begin to prevail over common ones, which can lead to 
corruption. 
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For real prevention of corruption in the 
private sector it is not enough to define the 
essence of this phenomenon, types and forms 
of its manifestation in society. It is necessary to 
focus on the determinants, producing it, which in 
their turn include conflict-generating factors.
A laconic definition of causes of corruption 
has been developed by a number of foreign 
economists in the analysis of corruption as 
an economic model of relations of “principal-
agent”. R. Klitgaard proposed to express it in 
the following formula: corruption = monopoly 
+ discretion – accountability. Corruption occurs 
only when the person authorized to make a 
decision, has a monopoly of power1 or a very wide 
scope of discretionary powers2. In other words, 
the cause of corruption (conflict-generating factor 
of corrupt behavior) is that a single individual 
has opportunity to make decisions aimed at 
others and desire to abuse this opportunity. 
In modern criminological literature in Russia 
there have been developed sufficient number of 
various classifications of reasons (determinants) 
for crime and corrupt behavior3. However, the 
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authors do not make specific conclusions whether 
determinants can include conflict-generating 
factors. We believe that it does not contradict 
the fundamentals of criminology, and for the 
purposes of this article we use these words as 
synonyms
Most often determinants of corruption 
are divided into economic, political, legal and 
psychological4, sometimes social, spiritual, 
moral, psychological and organizational and 
management determinants are added5.
The system of social factors determining 
crimes of corruption is very diverse. These 
include:
– absence of the state ideology, directing to 
legitimate solution of problems connected 
with corruption; 
– legal nihilism; 
– legal passivity and ignorance of a 
significant part of the adult population, 
which make them too heavily dependent 
on law enforcer6; 
– underdevelopment of civil society7; 
– changes in social values and morality, the 
general decline in the cultural level of the 
masses8. 
Among social factors there may also be 
anomy, i.e. a state of society in which its members 
have lost the importance of social norms 
and regulations. According to R.K. Merton, 
committing crime may be not only an abnormal 
reaction of an abnormal individual to normal 
social conditions, but also a normal reaction of an 
normal individual to abnormal conditions9. 
According to V.A. Nomokonov, “a common 
objective source of antisocial and criminal 
behavior is deformation of social relations. Causes 
of crime are a product of not only the so-called 
social subsystems, but also a systemic effect, 
resulting from global or partial defectiveness 
of society as a whole. This defectiveness is not 
only and is not so much in economic problems. 
“Defectiveness” is an integrative indicator of the 
state of, first of all, imbalance, acute conflicts of 
interests of citizens, social groups, society and 
the state”10.
Specificity of manifestations of the nature of 
corrupt behavior in the private sector is the fact 
that the social environment may push to, as well 
as warn against, committing crimes related to 
official position of the offender.
In relation to the analyzed social phenomenon 
the position of Henry Mendras is of interest, 
who drew attention to another important social 
factor of corruption: when directors move from 
one place of work to another, they usually take 
with them their loyal colleagues – their “clients” 
who are faithful to them, because they “make 
a career”. Directors have power through such 
“clients” – the power of the first and the career of 
the second go hand in hand. The “team“concept 
of staff appointments has social preconditions11.
We should not forget about such socio-
psychological phenomenon as stigmatization. 
The influence of stigmatizing effect is studied by 
K. Sedlenieks. It is because “everybody knows” 
that in certain countries (e.g. countries with “ 
transition economy”) there is more corruption 
by definition, we are inclined to use the term 
“corruption” to describe many of the socio – 
economic relations, which, being found in the 
countries of “the first” world, do not classify as 
corruption12. As a result, in foreign countries 
there is the impression of a very high level of 
corruption in certain countries and impossibility 
to achieve certain goals without using corruption 
schemes. Thus, a foreign entrepreneur, who has 
knowledge from various sources about the high 
level of corruption in Russia, when deciding 
on doing business in Russia or with Russian 
companies can immediately take a decision about 
the use of corruption mechanisms.
In this work we would like to pay a 
particular attention to socio- psychological and 
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psychological of causes of corruption crime in the 
private sector, as they are, in our opinion, crucial 
in the implementation of special preventive 
measures..
Most often, among the psychological causes 
of corrupt behavior are the following: 
– low level of solidarity of the population 
with the norms of responsibility for 
corruption;
– some exaggeration in the public 
consciousness of the level of corruption 
in the administrative apparatus, including 
organizations;
– psychological readiness of a considerable 
part of the population to bribery for 
realization of both legal and illegal 
rights;
– extremely low subjectively perceived 
risk of being prosecuted for corruption 
offenses ;
– the phenomenon of mutual guilt of the 
briber and the bribe-receiver13.
Factors affecting corrupt behavior are most 
evident in the psychology of large social groups. 
For the individual who directs the work of an 
organization in the private sector, or works there 
in any capacity, a job in such an organization is 
not a service to the society or the organization, 
but rather getting privileges and satisfaction of 
personal interests at the expense of the society 
or organization. Inclining in favour of corrupt 
behavior, the individual who directs the work of 
an organization in the private sector or works in 
any capacity in such an organization is influenced 
by cognitive dissonance 14. The essence of this 
theory, proposed by L. Festinger15, is that a 
person’s attitudes change because he/she has to 
maintain consistency between his/her knowledge. 
The person feels stress (“dissonance”) when 
two thoughts or two beliefs (“cognitions”) are 
psychologically incompatible. This occurs when 
the person decides to do or say something that he/
she has mixed feelings about. To reduce tension 
the person often adjusts his/her attitude16. In the 
mind of a person who directs the work of an 
organization in the private sector or works in any 
capacity in such an organization, there appears 
a contradiction between understanding of 
importance of the work that he/she does, and its 
low social guarantees. To resolve this contradiction 
a person often inclines toward corrupt behavior, 
thereby satisfying his/her expectations for social 
guarantees of his/her work.
In some cases, criminal behavior of a person 
who directs the work of an organization in the 
private sector or works in any capacity in such an 
organization is affected by the mutual exchange 
rule, which states that a person must try to repay 
in this way for something that another person 
provided him with17. 
Another factor affecting criminal corruption 
behavior is conformism that changes beliefs or 
behavior in response to real or imagined group 
pressure in those cases when there is no explicit 
requirement to agree with the group, nor any 
reason that could justify this change of behavior18. 
Among the people who direct the work of 
organizations in the private sector or work in any 
capacity in such organizations, as in any other 
professional groups specific tradition are formed, 
which are unspokenly followed by all members 
of this profession. Following this tradition, they 
create the most comfortable conditions for their 
existence. It is transformed into a formula for 
success and career growth: “do like everyone 
else, and you will achieve positive results”. Young 
specialists coming to work in a company, adopt 
the negative experience from older colleagues. 
Thus, the organization becomes a “school” of 
traditions of corrupt behavior19.
Entrepreneurs, inclining to criminal corrupt 
behavior, are greatly influenced by conformism. 
Since the vast majority of representatives of this 
sphere give commercial bribes (illegal payments) 
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and this phenomenon is not condemned by the 
professional community, there is a supposition 
that this behavior is normal and necessary for 
business20. Moreover, rejection of such behavior 
may lead to unnecessary increase of business 
risks (because it is impossible to talk about fair 
competition between those who give commercial 
bribes (illegal payments) and those – who 
do not). Giving a commercial bribe (illegal 
payment) does not guarantee future success 
of business, but rejecting corrupt behavior is 
very often related to being ousted from the 
market. 
Corrupt behavior of entrepreneurs is also 
affected by the rule of mutual exchange. In 
some cases, the entrepreneur gives a commercial 
bribe (illegal payment) as gratitude for actions 
performed in his favor by a person who directs 
the work of an organization in the private sector 
or works in any capacity in such an organization. 
The second variant of behavior is when the 
entrepreneur purposefully provides services to a 
person, who directs the work of an organization 
in the private sector or works in any capacity 
in such an organization, putting the latter in a 
dependent position. 
The third group, which enters into corrupt 
relations in the private sector, is private individuals 
(citizens).
The theory of cognitive dissonance also 
explains criminal corrupt behavior of citizens. 
The general attitude of private individuals 
is that the person who directs the work of an 
organization in the private sector or works in 
any capacity in such an organization is a “man 
of the organization”, qualified to help citizens 
overcome certain difficulties. When a citizen is 
faced in practice with a person, who directs the 
work of an organization in the private sector or 
works, in any capacity, in such an organization, 
its in-organizational procedures create the 
impression that the persons who direct the work 
of an organization in the private sector or work in 
any capacity in such an organization, themselves 
hinder the realization of the rights of citizens. As a 
result, the only way to channel the activities of the 
person who directs the work of an organization in 
the private sector or works in any capacity in such 
an organization, in the direction of help expected 
from them by a citizen is to give a commercial 
bribe ( illegal payment).
It is possible to consider psychological 
causes of crime at the individual level through 
their place in the mechanism of criminal behavior 
and its formation.
We can assume that corrupt behavior of 
citizens and the person who directs the work of 
an organization in the private sector or works in 
any capacity in such an organization under the 
conditions of anomy is caused by various reasons. 
The theory of conflict explains deviant behavior 
by the presence of social conflicts, both class 
and group ones. Part of possible group conflicts 
has already been considered in the analysis of 
motivation of social groups. Clash of cultures 
can lead to contradiction in interpretations 
of social relations. Internalization of conflict 
creates a situation of internal conflict of values 
and interests that are also able to trigger social 
deviance. Besides, such type of corruption as 
nepotism as (favoritism in relation to relatives or 
friends regardless of their professional qualities) 
can be generated by a conflict of loyalty21.
It should be emphasized that the mechanism 
of corruption in principle may provide two 
versions of corrupt behavior : in one case there 
is interaction between two main actors, each of 
which seeks to satisfy their own interests with the 
help of corruption, and in another case corruption 
activity is reduced to the actions of only one 
person ( corruptionist ), who satisfies his personal 
interest or interests of other persons on his own 
(without interaction with other subjects ), using 
the power granted to him22.
– 658 –
Sergey D. Krasnousov. Conflict-Generating Factors of Corrupt Behavior
It is obvious that the mechanism of formation 
of criminal behavior in bilateral corruption has 
its own characteristics. For sellers of corruption 
services attractiveness of corrupt behavior is 
important, which, according to S.A. Golovko, 
consists of a number of factors23: the number and 
availability of a variety of benefits ; the degree 
of corruption behavior permitted by society and 
the state ; probability of punishment; the number 
and quality of work or services required from 
the corruptionist for receiving remuneration; 
possibility of performing work or services 
required from the seller of corruption services.
But corrupt behavior of the seller of 
corruption services depends on many other 
factors, in particular, the level of legal income of 
potential sellers of corruption services24.
The model of behavior of a corrupt buyer 
differs from the behavior of a corrupt seller, 
primarily in target function. The corruptionist- 
buyer always wants to get corrupt services as 
any normal buyer, with minimal costs. Demand 
for corrupt services depends on a number of 
variables, most significant among which are prices 
for corruption services. Supply of corruption 
services is affected by the demand and sphere of 
production of corruption services (prohibitions 
and restrictions in the legislation). In addition, 
there are a number of variables that affect both 
demand and supply:
– level of income of individuals interested 
in obtaining corrupt services;
– level of income of persons providing 
corrupt services;
– number and severity of bans on receiving 
corrupt services ;
– probability of disclosure and severity of 
punishment ;
– imposition of corrupt services by the 
seller ;
– imposition of demand for corrupt services 
by the buyer.
Based on different combinations of these 
variables, several classic models of corrupt 
behavior in bilateral corruption in the private 
sector can be identified.
The first model assumes interest of persons 
providing and receiving corrupt services in each 
other. In the case of realizing the first model the 
level of latency should be the highest25. “Corruption 
is not only secretive, but also consentient. It 
usually does not give rise to complaints, as the 
guilty parties are benefiting from the illegal 
transaction”26. Given the monopolistic nature of 
supply of corruption services, this model holds 
price discrimination.
The second model assumes that the subjects 
of corruption are not interested in each other. 
In the absence of demand and supply of corrupt 
services, corruption will equal to zero.
The third model considers the situation of 
imbalance when the person providing corruption 
services is interested in realizing these services, 
but the potential recipient is not interested. In this 
model, there is extortion of corruption services. 
Since the other side of corruption relations is not 
interested in them, it increases the risk for the 
corruptionist, and attempts to get extra payment 
for the risk increases it even more.
The fourth model is a mirror reversal of the 
third model. In this case, the person who can 
provide corruption services, is not interested in 
providing them, but the recipient is interested. 
In this case, the latter has higher uncompensated 
risks and other additional expenses. To achieve 
results, the recipient must either increase the 
size of remuneration offered to the potential 
corruptionist, or offer him an alternative “income”, 
for example, life and health of his family, etc.
An important role in the mechanism of 
formation of corrupt behavior is played by a 
motif. Among the most common motives for 
corrupt behavior we can name compensation for 
losses connected with working in a particular job 
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as perceived by the person who directs the work 
of an organization in the private sector or works 
in any capacity in such an organization. In this 
case, the following factors push to loss of moral 
immunity: 
– feeling of uncertainty ;
– low wages, not appropriate to 
qualifications and responsibilities of the 
work performed ;
– unfairness in promotions ;
– rudeness or incompetence of the boss27.
We agree with the opinion of V.I. Popov, 
who believes that the causes of corruption 
are predominantly ideological factors, rather 
than economic issues28. Therefore, they are 
psychological aspects that become crucial in 
determining the causes of corruption in general 
and in the private sector in particular. 
When considering the causes of corruption in 
the private sector it is necessary to remember that 
corruption is impossible without power, it appears 
only in the depths of the mechanism of realization 
of “power relations”, changing its functional 
purpose, in connection with which, the work of 
this mechanism is carried out only in the interests 
of participants in corrupt relations. In corruption 
“power relations” cease to fully or partially fulfill 
a socially useful role in management of society, 
and are used by corruptionists solely as a means 
to achieve their own goals29. Corruption exists 
because the person who directs the work of a 
company in the private sector or works, in any 
capacity, in such an organization can administer 
resources that do not belong to him by making 
or not making certain decisions30. In other words, 
corruption always involves improper use of public 
power for private benefit31. Therefore, we can 
conclude that causes of corruption are directly 
related to implementation of power.
But the main reason of corruption and, 
consequently, a conflict-generating factor of 
corrupt behavior, as part of this reason is, in our 
opinion, a contradicting conflict in the person 
who is delegated with powers between his 
private interests and public ones. In the course 
of evolution a person is programmed for “selfish 
socialization”, which means that people can only 
exist and develop within society, but always 
strive to realize their own individual interests. 
Therefore, there is a tendency in every person: 
to benefit at the expense of others, especially 
if the probability of being caught is or seems 
insignificant. In most cases, the person focuses on 
the immediate areas, both territorial and temporal 
(the sphere of immediate interest), this leads to the 
fact that what falls within this sphere has more 
value than what lies beyond. This circumstance 
also reinforces the priority of group and 
individual interests, which are usually located in 
the sphere of a person’s immediate interest, above 
all others, including the persons who direct the 
work of the organizations of the private sector or 
work in such organizations. Thus, the propensity 
for corruption is not an exception, but rather is 
part of human nature32. But with management 
mechanism becoming more complicated, certain 
powers being delegated to a certain person who 
directs the work of an organization in the private 
sector or work in such an organization, the circle 
of common interests becomes much broader than 
those that fall within the immediate interests of 
this person. Group and individual interests begin 
to prevail over common ones, which can lead to 
corruption. 
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Конфликтогенные факторы  
коррупционного поведения
С.Д. Красноусов 
Сибирский федеральный университет 
Россия, 660041, Красноярск, пр. Свободный, 79
В статье рассмотрены факторы, способствующие развитию и вскрытию конфликта, 
провоцирующие людей на обострение противоречий, итогом которых становится совершение 
коррупционных деяний в частном секторе. Основной конфликтогенный фактор коррупции 
кроется, по мнению автора, в наличии противоречия у лица, которому делегировали властные 
полномочия, между его личными интересами и интересами организации. В большинстве 
случаев человек сфокусирован на ближайших сферах – как территориальных, так и временных 
(сфера ближайшего интереса). Это приводит к тому, что для него большее значение имеет 
то, что попадает в указанную сферу, чем то, что за нее выходит. Это обстоятельство 
также усиливает приоритет групповых и индивидуальных интересов, которые, как правило, 
находятся в сфере его ближайшего интереса, над всеми другими, в том числе и у лиц, которые 
руководят работой организации частного сектора или работают в такой организации. Таким 
образом, склонность к коррумпированности не является исключением, а скорее составляет 
часть человеческой натуры. Но при усложнении механизма управления, при делегировании 
отдельных полномочий определенному лицу, которое руководит работой организации частного 
сектора или работает в такой организации, круг общих интересов становится значительно 
шире, чем те, которые входят в сферу ближайших интересов указанного лица. Групповые 
и индивидуальные интересы начинают превалировать над общими, что может привести к 
совершению коррупционных правонарушений.
Ключевые слова: коррупция, конфликт, факторы, частный сектор.
